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CRIMINAL LAW
MISTAIKE OF FACT IN THE OBJECTIVE
THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION: DO TWO
RIGHTS MAKE TWO WRONGS MAKE
TWO RIGHTS... ?
RUSSELL L. CHIUSTOPHER*
"The most difficult problems in criminal theory are generated by
dissonance between reality and belief, between the objective facts and
the actor's subjective impression of the facts."' One particularly
thorny instantiation of this difficulty is whether the use of defensive
force by actors who reasonably, but mistakenly, believe that they are
being attacked should be justified or only excused.2 There are two
* Research Associate, Columbia University School of Law. A.B. 1983, Hamilton Col-
lege; J.D. 1988, University of Michigan Law School. I wish to thank Thelma Christopher
and Maria Pagano for their criticisms of earlier drafts.
I GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 683 (1978). See also DOUGLAS N.
HusAK, PHILOSOPHY oF CRIMINAL LAW 211-12 (1987) ("The problem that has bedeviled
criminal theory since its inception is to provide a principled account of when mistakes have
a bearing on liability."); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSMTN W. SCorr,JR., SUBSTANTrvE CRIMINAL
LAW 575 (1986) ("No area of the substantive criminal law has traditionally been sur-
rounded by more confusion than that of ignorance or mistake of fact or law.").
2 See e.g., B. Sharon Byrd, Wrongdoing and Attribution: Implications Beyond the Justification-
Excuse Distinction, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 1289, 1321 (1987) (footnote omitted) ("The vast ma-
jority of criticism of the justification-excuse distinction involves the issue of mistake.");
Joshua Dressier, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature, 33
WAYNE L. Rav. 1155, 1161-63 n.22 (1987) (identifying the issue as one of the three princi-
pal controversies regardingjustifications which have been argued in the literature); Benja-
min B. Sendor, Mistakes of Fact: A Study in the Structure of Criminal Conduct, 25 WAKE FoREST
L. REV. 707, 753 (1990) ("The question of whether a mistake about justificatory circum-
stances should be classified as ajustification defense or as an excuse defense has generated
a lively scholarly debate in recent years."); id. at 708 ("a thorny issue of criminal law theory.
whether mistakes about justificatory circumstances should be classified as justifications or
excuses"); Gunter Stratenwerth, The Problem of Mistake in Self-Defense in 2JUsTIFICATroN AND
ExcusE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECrIVES 1055, 1057 (Albin Eser & George Fletcher eds., 1987)
("The question of how to handle the problem of putative [mistaken] self-defense has been
one of the most controversial topics in German case law and doctrine for many years.").
One commentator has even expressed skepticism about whether the problem of mis-
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main approaches to this problem of mistaken justification. The first
approach is the common law or Anglo-American approach, 3 which
views the justificatory circumstances from the subjective perceptions of
the actor: force is eligible for justification if an actor believes it is
necessary orjustified (subjective theory ofjustification). 4 The second
approach is the civil law or Continental approach which regards the
justificatory circumstances from an objective viewpoint external from
the actor: force is eligible for justification if it actually is necessary
(objective theory ofjustification).5 There are two principal versions of
the Continental approach. Professor Paul Robinson champions a
purely objective theory of justification, in which an actor's subjective
taken justification is susceptible to resolution: "Perhaps no single argument can resolve
this dispute, and for good reason." Douglas N. Husak, Justifications and the Criminal Liability
of Accessories, 80J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 491, 507 (1989).
Justifications and excuses are defenses for conduct that satisfies the definition of a
criminal offense. The philosopher J.L. Austin, in his paper "A Plea For Excuses," distin-
guished justifications from excuses as follows: "In the one defence, briefly we accept re-
sponsibility but deny that it was bad Uustification]; in the other we admit that it was bad
but don't accept full, or even any, responsibility [excuse]." JOHN L. AUSTIN, PHILOsOPHIcAL
PAPERS 176 (J.O. Urmson & GeoffreyJ. Warmock eds., 2d ed. 1970). Fletcher supplies the
following concise account of the distinction: "Ajustification speaks to the rightness of an
act; an excuse, to whether the actor is accountable for a concededly wrongful act."
FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 759. Justifications and excuses also affect the rights of other
parties in the following general ways:
Justified action is warranted action; similar actions could properly be performed by
others; such actions should not be interfered with by those capable of stopping them;
and such actions may be assisted by those in a position to render aid. If action is
excused, the actor is relieved of blame but others may not properly perform similar
actions; interference with such actions is appropriate; and assistance of such actions is
wrongful.
Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders ofJustification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897,
1900 (1984) (footnote omitted) (citing FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 760-61; Albin Eser,Justi-
fication and Excuse, 24 AM. J. ComP. L. 621, 622-23 (1976)).
Regarding the importance of the distinction, one commentator has stated that
"[p]erhaps the most significant and controversial research program among contemporary
criminal theorists is the investigation of the advantages and limitations of applications of
the distinction between justification and excuse." Husak, supra, at 491 (footnote omitted).
For a recent overview of the justification-excuse distinction and the debate surrounding it,
see Dressler, supra, at 1155.
3 George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARv. L. REv. 949, 971-80 (1985).
4 A typical requirement of a subjective theory ofjustification is that an actor's belief be
reasonable. See, e.g., I MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARiES § 3.09, Comment 2, at 151
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) ("unreasonableness of an alleged belief quite
properly is considered as evidence that it was not in fact held"); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04,
Explanatory Note, at 32 (Official Draft 1985) (if an actor's "belief is mistaken and is reck-
lessly or negligently formed, he may then be prosecuted for an offense of recklessness or
negligence under Section 3.09").
5 Fletcher, supra note 3, at 971-80. An objective theory of justification is employed
throughout continental Western Europe including French and German criminal law




perceptions and mental state are irrelevant.6 Professor George
Fletcher suggests a hybrid theory requiring both the actual necessity
of an actor's force and an actor's subjective belief in the necessity, of
that force. 7 The subjective theory would justify an actor's mistaken
use of force; either version of the objective theory would only excuse
it.
Fletcher, lauded for resurrecting the justification-excuse distinc-
tion in modem criminal law,8 contends that "we can use the concepts
6 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 122(f), at 27 (1984) ("To summarize,
an objective theory ofjustification suggests that no subjective mental elements should play
a part in the formulation ofjustification defenses."); id. § 121(c), at 7 ("U]ustification prin-
ciples... are stated in a purely objective form, without any mention of the actor's subjec-
tive mental state.").
Robinson's views on justification and criminal defenses have enjoyed considerable ac-
claim: Kenneth Campbell, Offence and Defence, in CRIMINAL LAw AND JusTicE 73, 76 (I.H.
Dennis ed., 1987) (footnote omitted) ("Any discussion of defenses for quite some time to
come is going to be indebted to the work of Professor Paul Robinson."); Husak, supra note
2, at 491 n.2 ("The most outspoken champions of this distinction [ustification-excuse] in
Anglo-American law are George Fletcher and Paul Robinson."); id. at 498 ("Since Robin-
son has provided the most detailed and sophisticated account of defenses in Anglo-Ameri-
can criminal theory, it is important to examine his position on justifications.").
For a critique of the purely objective theory ofjustification justifying an actor unaware
of existing justificatory circumstances see Russell L. Christopher, Unknowing Justification
and the Logical Necessity of the Dadson Principle, 15 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming
1995).
7 Fletcher, supra note 3, at 972 (emphasis added) ("Justification-harmony with the
Right is an objective phenomenon. Mere belief cannot generate a justification, however
reasonable the belief might be."); see FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 576 ("Claims ofjustifica-
tion always require a union of objective elements and a subjective intent."); George P.
Fletcher, The Right to Lif, 13 GA. L. REv. 1371, 1384-85 (1979) ("objective circumstances
are not enough to support a claim of justification; the actor must act with the right rea-
sons"); George P. Fletcher, Mistake in the Model Penal Code: A False False Problema, 19 RUTGERS
L.J. 649, 663 (1988) ("The complex of criteria bearing on the justification of self-defense
consist of objective and subjective elements: the objective factors of aggression and neces-
sary response, and a subjective requirement of intent or knowledge.").
8 See, e.g., the following commentators who credit Fletcher for reviving interest in the
concepts ofjustification and excuse:
In recent years the academic landscape has changed. George Fletcher is credited with
"crying in the wilderness" about the lack of academic attention to the concepts of
justification and excuse. Through his writings, Professor Fletcher has sought to clarify
the meaning of the two terms and to demonstrate the importance of the concepts in a
mature legal system.
Professor Fletcher's scholarship has borne fruit. The field is now fairly rich in
literature ....
Dressier, supra note 2, at 1159 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Greenawalt, supra note 2, at
1897); Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept ofJustfication in the Criminal Law: A
Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32 U.C.LA. L. REv. 61, 63 (1984) ("George
Fletcher is largely responsible for this modern interest."); Eser, supra note 2, at 621 ("with
the exception of George Fletcher, who seems to stand alone in fully recognizing the funda-
mental distinction"); Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 1897-98 (footnote omitted) ("Crying in
the wilderness, however, are a few possibly prophetic voices, among which the loudest and
most eloquent is George Fletcher's."); Robert F. Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Con-
1994]
RUSSELL L. CHRISTOPHER
ofjustification and excuse only when we are willing to accept the logi-
cal consequences of applying them to particular cases of conflict" 9
However, the logical consequences of applying Fletcher's and Robin-
son's objective theories of justification are logical contradictions and
paradoxes. Examining an altered hypothetical case of conflict pro-
pounded by Fletcher himself reveals that the objective theories are
self-contradictory. Each actor's conduct in the altered hypothetical is
paradoxically justified and not justified at the same time. Unless such
logical contradictions are deemed acceptable, 10 the objective theory's
future influence may be in jeopardy.
Fletcher has derided the Anglo-American approach to justifica-
tion, which utilizes the subjective theory, as "still in Plato's cave and
... barely perceiv[ing] the shadows of criminal theory."'" But apply-
ing the subjective theory ofjustification to the same hypothetical does
not generate any logical contradictions or paradoxes. Thus, the ob-
jective theories of justification may be seeing some shadows of their
own. Though perhaps flawed, the conceptually consistent subjective
theory of justification may now be viewed as preferable to the self-
contradictory objective theories.
The central difference between the two approaches is evident
from one of Fletcher's hypotheticals: 12 Suppose Dan reasonably, but
incorrectly, believes that Allan is wrongfully attacking him. In what he
reasonably believes to be justified self-defense, Dan attacks Allan. Al-
lan then uses defensive force against Dan. Under a subjective theory
of justification, both Dan's reasonably mistaken force and Allan's
force would be justified.' 3 Under an objective theory of justification,
victions, 24 PAc. LJ. 1233, 1238 (1993) ("Much of the contemporary discussion ofjustifica-
tion defenses takes the form of a debate between George Fletcher and a series of
critics... ."); A.T.H. Smith, Rethinking the Defence of Mistake, 2 OXFORD J. LEc.AL STUD. 429,
430 (1982) ("[W]e can be grateful to Fletcher for helping us to see the point more
clearly."); Glanville L. Williams, The Theoy of Excuses, 1982 GRIM. L. Ray. 732, 732 ("We are
indebted to Professor George Fletcher for reviving interest in the distinction between justi-
fication and excuse in criminal law.").
9 George P. Fletcher, Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate aJustification or an Ex-
cuse For Escape?, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1355, 1358 (1979).
10 A comment by Fletcher suggests that logical contradictions in legal theory should
not be considered acceptable: "In some circles of supposedly critical thought, it is even
fashionable to tolerate contradictions as an inescapable feature of legal thought. These
antitheoretical and antirational strains in legal thought discourage dialogue and preclude
advances in our understanding of legal phenomena." George P. Fletcher, Paradoxes in
Legal Thought, 85 COLUm. L. Rv. 1263, 1264 (1985) (footnote omitted). For more of
Fletcher's thoughts on logical inconsistencies in legal discourse, see infra text accompany-
ing note 27, note 80, text accompanying note 122, note 132.
"1 George P. Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor. A Vignette in Comparative
Criminal Theory, 8 IsRAEL L. Ray. 367, 390 (1973).
12 Fletcher, supra note 3, at 972-73.
13 Id. at 973, 975.
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however, Dan's force is "putatively"14 justified (i.e., excused), and only
Allan's force is actually justified.15
Fletcher argues that because the subjective theory "assimilat[es] a
putative justification to an actual justification [, it] undermines the
matrix of legal relationships affected by a [valid] claim of justifica-
tion."16 Under the subjective theory, a third-party intervenor's force
in defense of either Dan or Allan or even both could be justified. Fur-
thermore, if Allan realized that Dan believed he was justified, the use
of force by Allan (the innocent victim) against Dan (the initial aggres-
sor) would not be justified.17 By justifying only Allan's force, the ob-
jective theory avoids incompatible or conflicting justifications
(between Dan and Allan), the legal anarchy of an intervenorjustifia-
bly using force against an innocent victim (Allan) or whichever actor
the intervenor chooses, and the anomaly of barring an innocent vic-
tim from using justified force.
Advocates of the subjective theory counter that incompatible jus-
tifications are not a serious flaw18 and that, in any event, incompatible
justifications also occur under the objective theory.19 Yet Fletcher's
"incompatibility thesis" 20 dictates that incompatible justifications aris-
14 Fletcher has defined "putatively"justified actors as those who believe that their force
is justified because of a reasonable mistake of fact such that if they had perfect or complete
knowledge of the situation, they would not reasonably believe force wasjustified. Although
a subjective theory ofjustification would justify such an actor's force, an objective theory
would only excuse such actors. FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 762-69; Fletcher, supra note 3, at
972.
15 Fletcher, supra note 3, at 972-73.
16 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 763.
17 Fletcher, supra note 3, at 975 n.116.
18 See, e.g., CAmRLas FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 48 (1978) (conflicting or incompatible
justifications are "unfortunate but in no sense a contradiction" and are "a possibility in any
theory which judges the morality of an action from the perspective of an actor's factual
perceptions."); Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 1909 n.33 (incompatible justifications are
merely a "supposed paradox"); id. at 1921 (incompatible justifications are only a "claimed
anomaly").
19 See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 8, at 63-64, 88-89, 91 n.168; David Dolinko, Note, Intoler-
able Conditions as a Defense to Prison Escapes, 26 U.C.LA. L. RE,. 1126, 1180 n.298 (1979).
20 "It would strike most Continental theorists as contradictory to say that both sides to
[a] conflict were justified in their use of force. It is in the nature of justification, they
would say, that if two people are locked in conflict, only one person can be justified."
FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 767 (footnote omitted); Fletcher, supra note 3, at 975 ("in any
situation of physical conflict, where only one party can prevail, logic prohibits us from
recognizing that more than one of the parties could be justified in using force. I shall refer
to this proposition as the 'incompatibility thesis.'");
If a convict has the right to leave a burning jail, a guard cannot also have a right to
keep him confined. If Dan has the right to use force against Allan, Allan cannot also
have the right to use force against Dan. This strikes me as the natural way to speak
about rights. The impossibility of inconsistent rights seems implicit in the grammar of




ing under an objective theory are "logically impossible." 21
Professor Kent Greenawalt has provided, in Fletcher's terms, "the
most sustained and sophisticated defense" ofjustifying the mistaken
actor. 22 First, Greenawalt expresses skepticism that any bright-line dis-
tinction between justifications and excuses can be drawn. Second,
Greenawalt proposes a number of hypotheticals illustrating that an
actor may mistakenly assess thejustificatory circumstances, but still act
in a morally praiseworthy manner. Since such conduct is not morally
wrong, it must be justified.23 Robinson claims that Greenawalt's hy-
potheticals rely on reasonable mistakes of fact, which only generate
putative justifications and "suggest a preference for the comparative
conceptual clarity of an objective theory."24 Professor Michael Moore
Id. at 978 (footnote omitted); Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1360 ("in cases of incompatible
conduct, one and only one party must have a right to prevail"); id. at 1358 ("if two people
are making an effort to execute incompatible acts, both of them cannot bejustified. Only
one can have a right to engage in his desired act and therefore be justified in doing so.").
In a more recent article, Fletcher has termed the "impermissibility of logically inconsistent
claims ofjustification" as the "one Right thesis": "The thesis holds that only one side to a
zero-sum conflict (where one gains as much as the other loses) can act justifiably and thus
be in the Right." George P. Fletcher, The Psychotic Aggressor-A Generation Later, 27 ISRAEL.
L. Rxv. 227, 236 (1993).
Fletcher's thesis also finds expression in German philosophy and criminal law theory.
Professor Albin Eser states:
On the one hand it seems quite obvious that you cannot exercise justifiable self-de-
fense against an act that is itself an act ofjustified self-defense because otherwise you
get into a circle which perhaps none of the participants would leave unwounded, but
in which all would be justified in having wounded the respective other victim. If the
law is to prevent "civil war" in which each participant claims to have justice on his side,
then the right of self-defense, as well as virtually any other justification, cannot be on
both sides. In this respect, in German jurisprudence the so-called "self-defense test"
has become a "rule of thumb" for determining whether a person should have the right
of self-defense against an invasion of his rights: This can only be the case if the inva-
sion is not itself justified.
Albin Eser, Justification and Excuse: A Key Issue in the Concept of Crime, in 1 JUSTIFICATION AND
EXCUSE: COMPARATIvE PERSPECrIVES 17, 31-32 (Albin Eser & George Fletcher eds., 1987)
(footnote omitted). Regarding whether two actors in physical conflict could both bejusti-
fied, or in the right, the philosopher Immanuel Kant concluded that "[i]t is evident that
were there such a right the doctrine of Right would have to be in contradiction with itself."
Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Right 235, in THE METArHYsIcs OF MoRA.S 60 (Mary Gregor
trans., 1991) (cited by Fletcher, supra, at 236).
21 Fletcher, supra note 3, at 978.
22 Fletcher, supra note 20, at 241.
23 Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 1908-09. See also PETER W. Low ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW
541-48 (1982); Dolinko, supra note 19, at 1179 n.297; Dressier, supra note 8; Kent Greena-
walt, Distinguishing Justfications from Excuses, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (Summer
1986); Husak, supra note 2, at 507-08; Thomas Morawetz, Reconstructing the Criminal De-
fenses: The Significance of Justification, 77J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 277, 289 n.42 (1986)
(supporting some form of a subjective theory of justification).
24 Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L. Ruv.
729, 752 n.57 (1990). Robinson's complete response is as follows:
From the perspective of objective justification, it is entirely predictable that Greena-
walt would conclude that the borders ofjustification and excuse are "perplexing," as
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argues that Greenawalt's hypotheticals are all based on the premise
that justification is subjective; the examples beg the question of
whether justification should be objective. 25
By altering Fletcher's above hypothetical, this Article will demon-
strate that both Fletcher's andRobinson's objective theories ofjustifi-
cation succumb to a logical contradiction that leaves the subjective
theory unscathed. Suppose that instead of only Dan holding the rea-
sonably mistaken belief, Dan and Allan each reasonably, but incor-
rectly, believe that the other is attacking him. As a result of their
reasonably mistaken beliefs, Dan and Allan each attack the other in
what each reasonably believes is justified self-defense.
How would an objective theory treat this altered version of
Fletcher's hypothetical? In the original hypothetical, Fletcher con-
cluded that Dan's force was not actually justified but only putatively
justified. Similarly, if only Allan, not Dan, held the reasonably mis-
the title of his article suggests. [Greenawalt, supra note 2]. By defining justifications
to include reasonably mistaken justifications, his attempt to distinguish justification
and excuse is an attempt to distinguish mistaken justifications from excuses, which
cannot successfully be done, I believe, because mistaken justifications are excuses. I
believe that his conclusion, that the doctrine ought not systematically embody the
justification-excuse distinction, must be qualified. The justification-excuse distinction
is troublesome only if one adopts a subjective theory of justification, as Greenawalt
does. Most, if not all, of his troublesome cases are clear and unproblematic under an
objective theory of justification. In fact, one might conclude that the point he has
demonstrated in his article is not perplexing borders ofjustification and excuse, but
rather that the perplexing borders created by the use of a subjective theory suggest a
preference for the comparative conceptual clarity of an objective theory.
Id.
For other defenses of the objective theory against the criticisms of commentators who
support a subjective theory, see Byrd, supra note 2, at 1333-41; Fletcher, supra note 20, at
236-46; Fletcher, supra note 3, at 977-78; Fletcher, supra note 9; Winfried HassemerJustfi-
cation and Excuse in Ciminal Law: Theses and Comments, B.Y.U. L. Ruv. 573, 607-08 (1986);
Terry L. Price, Faultless Mistake of Fact: justification or Excuse?, 12 CIM. JuST. ETmICS 14
(Summer/Fall 1993); 2 ROBINSON, supra note 6, § 121(c), at 7-9; Schopp, supra note 8, at
1280-82; Sendor, supra note 2, at 753-74.
25 Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1096 n.19 (1985)
("I choose to treat them [reasonably mistaken justifications] as excused actions, because
this is the only way I can make the [justification-excuse] distinction survive the elegant
counterexamples to be found throughout Greenawalt's paper."); MICHAEL S. MOORE, Acr
AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAw 183
(1993):
Greenawalt's mistake is with his initial premise.... So long as one classifies mistaken
beliefs about elements of normallyjustificatory defence to be excuses, there is no 'per-
plexing border' here....
Although Greenawalt elegantly details a variety of other examples in his nicely
written article, all are premised on the assumption thatjustification is a subjective mat-
ter, that is, that it is governed by what the accused reasonably believes and not by the
objective facts of the matter. Change that assumption, as I have urged we must, and
none of such examples present any conceptual problems for the line between the




taken belief and attacked Dan, Allan's conduct would not be actually
justified but only putativelyjustified. Therefore, it is tempting to con-
clude that in the altered hypothetical both Dan and Allan are mistak-
enly or putatively justified. However, that contention is shown to be
clearly wrong. This Article will demonstrate that, under the objective
theories, Dan's force and Allan's force are each, paradoxically, justi-
fied and not justified at the same time. As a result, the objective theo-
ries of justification are self-contradictory.
At stake is not merely which theory ofjustification is logically con-
sistent, but also the very nature of justification in criminal law. By
tinkering with the requisite elements which an actor's force must sat-
isfy in order to be justified under an objective theory, the paradox can
be avoided. Yet, a subsequent hypothetical will be advanced which
demonstrates that the logical contradiction cannot be circumvented
satisfactorily without excising the very heart of the objective theories:
Fletcher's incompatibility thesis and Robinson's correlate principle
that force cannot justifiably be used against justified force.2 6 Their
removal will leave a radically reconfigured justification formulation
and will eliminate the primary support for the theory's tenets regard-
ing the nature of justification and criminal responsibility. Conse-
quently, proponents of, and jurisdictions employing, an objective
theory will be faced with the conundrum of maintaining their self-
contradictory theory, amending it to an eviscerated form, or aban-
doning it in favor of a subjective theory.
Fletcher suggests that when "[c]onfronted by data not explaina-
ble by the prevailing theory, theorists must either confess the incom-
pleteness or inadequacy of their system or revise their tools of analysis
to accommodate the anomaly."27 If so, advocates of, and jurisdictions
employing, an objective theory ofjustification in the criminal law will
now have such a choice before them.
26 1 ROBINSON, supra note 6, § 36(a) (2), at 165 (footnote omitted) (citing FLETCHER,
supra note 1, at 760-61, 869-70) ("Where an aggressor has a justification defense, the
proper rule is clear: justified aggression should never be lawfully subject to resistance or
interference."); 2 ROBINSON, supra note 6, § 131(b) (2), at 74 ("In order to trigger a defen-
sive force defense the aggressor must unjustifiably threaten harm to the defendant."); id at
75 (actor "may not, however, lawfully defend against justified aggression."); id. § 3-1(3),
Model Codifications, app. A, at 564 ("Except as otherwise provided by law, conduct that is
justified is privileged and may not be lawfully resisted or interfered with, and may be law-
fully assisted by any other person."); Paul H. Robinson, A Theory ofJustification: Societal
Harm as a Prerequisite for Ciminal Liability, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 266, 278 (1975) ("It is sug-
gested here that any justified act-notjust those specified by statute-should be free from
defensive force."); id. ("[I]f burning the field is justifiable, it would be inconsistent to con-
clude that a person may lawfully prevent it.... [0] nly one of the acts can be justified, and
the criminal code should require the nonjustified act to yield to the justified.").
27 Fletcher, supra note 10, at 1263-64.
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Part I of this Article will present a variation of Fletcher's above
hypothetical revealing the objective theories to be self-contradictory.
Part II introduces another hypothetical through which further logical
contradictions are derived under the objective theories. Part m
presents, considers, and rejects arguments against the conclusion that
the objective theories are self-contradictory. Part IV discusses the pro-
cedural ramifications of contradictions in the objective theories. Part
V explores the consequences of the self-contradictions for the objec-
tive theories' understanding of the underlying nature ofjustification
and criminal responsibility. Part VI sketches various amendments to
the objective theories which might dislodge the paradoxes, and con-
cludes that each amendment creates further conceptual anomalies for
the objective theories. Part VII summarizes the main currents of this
Article and lays down a challenge to jurisdictions employing, and ad-
vocates of, an objective theory to either satisfactorily expunge the con-
tradictions or abandon the objective approach in favor of the
subjective theory of justification.
I. LOGICAL CONTRADICTIONS DERIVED FROM FLETCHER'S AND
ROBINSON'S OBJECTrVE THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION
Applying either Fletcher's or Robinson's objective theory to the
following variation on Fletcher's hypothetical28 (Hypothetical 1) will
result in a logical contradiction.
Suppose Dan and Allan each reasonably, but incorrectly, believe that the
other is attacking him. In fact, neither Dan nor Allan is using force
against anyone. Dan and Allan each decide to use what each believes is
justified self-defense force against the other. Dan and Allan each use
similar force against the other simultaneously. Each actor's use of force
interferes with the other actor's use of force.
A. FLETCHER'S AND ROBINSON'S OBJECTIVE THEORIES
Actors are putatively justified, under an objective theory, if they
believe that their force is necessary orjustified, but had they possessed
complete knowledge of the circumstances they would not or could not
have reasonably believed that their use of force was necessary orjusti-
fied.29 It is possible to argue that both Dan and Allan are putatively
justified since each incorrectly believed that the other was attacking
him prior to either one using force. In Fletcher's original hypotheti-
28 Fletcher, supra note 3, at 972-73.
29 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 762-69. See Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 1907 ("People
often engage in conduct that would be justified if the actual facts were precisely as they




cal, in which only Dan is mistaken, no one would dispute that Dan is
putatively justified, but not actually justified, under an objective the-
ory. Since Dan's beliefs and conduct in this altered hypothetical are
identical to his beliefs and conduct in Fletcher's original hypothetical,
it might seem that Dan is putatively justified (but not actually justi-
fied), under an objective theory in the altered hypothetical as well.
Similarly, if it was Allan who mistakenly attacked Dan, Allan would be
putatively justified under an objective theory. Since Allan's beliefs
and conduct are identical in the above situation, as in the altered hy-
pothetical, it would appear that Allan is also putatively justified. It is
tempting, therefore, to conclude that both Dan and Allan, in the al-
tered hypothetical, are putatively justified under an objective theory.
But that conclusion is incorrect.
To ascertain whether the actors are putatively justified, it is neces-
sary to examine whether each actor would believe that his force was
necessary or justified if he had complete knowledge of the situation.
Suppose Dan had complete knowledge of the circumstances. He
would have known that Allan was not actually attacking him (prior to
their simultaneous force), that Allan believed that Dan was attacking
him (prior to their simultaneous force), and that Allan would immi-
nently use force against him. If Dan had not used force against Allan,
Allan would have used force against Dan unimpeded by Dan's force.
As a result, Dan would have sustained an even more forceful blow
from Allan. Therefore, even if Dan had complete knowledge of the
situation, Dan would have reasonably and correctly believed his force
to be necessary and justified. Consequently, Dan is not putativelyjus-
tified. The same form of argument demonstrating that Dan is not
putatively justified also demonstrates that Allan is not putatively
justified.
Considering Dan's and Allan's cases separately leads to the con-
clusion that neither Dan nor Allan is putativelyjustified. Yet, Dan not
being putatively justified is based on Allan not having complete knowl-
edge of the situation; and Allan not being putatively justified is based
on Dan not having complete knowledge of the situation. Neither Dan
nor Allan is putatively justified since if each had complete knowledge
of the situation, each would know that the other did not have com-
plete knowledge of the circumstances and that the other would immi-
nently use force based on an incorrect belief.
One might argue that since each actor's being not putatively justi-
fied depends on the other actor not having complete knowledge, only
one of the actors is not putatively justified. However, the standard for
determining whether an actor is not putatively justified does not re-
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quire that other actors have complete knowledge.30 It requires only
that the actor in question have complete knowledge. For example, in
determining whether Dan was not putatively justified, the only issue is
whether Dan, himself, could still reasonably believe that his force was
necessary or justified if he had complete knowledge of the circum-
stances-Allan's or anyone else's beliefs are irrelevant to this inquiry.
Since both Dan and Allan-individually-meet this standard, neither
is putatively justified.
Although neither actor is putatively justified, it is nonetheless pos-
sible that neither actor's use of force is justified in self-defense under
Fletcher's and Robinson's objective theories of justification. While
Robinson's theory does not require that an actor have any particular
mental state, Fletcher's theory requires that an actor act with justifica-
tory intent or knowledge of the justificatory circumstances. 31
Although Dan perhaps lacks knowledge of the justificatory circum-
stances, he does act with justificatory intent since he believes that his
use of force is justified.3 2
Further, suppose that the force Dan used was proportional and
"the minimal force necessary."33 Objectively viewed, was Dan's force
30 In order for an actor to be not putatively justified, his belief that his force is neces-
sary or justified would not be altered if he had complete knowledge of the situation. See
supra note 29 and accompanying text.
31 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 559-60, 565.
32 Fletcher states that "[t] here might be a stronger and weaker version of the rule; the
stronger version would require the actor to be motivated exclusively by the justificatory
criteria; the weaker version, that he merely be aware of them." Id. at 559 (footnote omit-
ted). Curiously, Dan satisfies the stronger version of the rule, but does not satisfy the
weaker version.
33 Fletcher, supra note 3, at 973 ("Allan may use the minimal force necessary to ward off
Dan's attack."); FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 870 ("There are two requirements for the exer-
cise of necessary force: (1) that the means chosen be the minimal force necessary under
the circumstances; and (2) that the force not be unreasonable or disproportionate relative
to the interest defended."). Yet it is not entirely clear that Fletcher's theory fully endorses
the principle of proportionality. Compare id. (force must be proportional) with FLETCHER,
supra note 1, at 871-74 and Fletcher, supra note 11, at 371-80 (a requirement that force be
proportional may conflict with the absolute right to defend one's autonomy). One com-
mentator views Fletcher as supporting proportionality as a moral criterion, but not as a
legal requirement. Nancy M. Omichinski, Note, Applying the Theories ofJustifiable Homicide to
Conflicts in the Doctrine of Self-Defense 33 WAYNE L. REv. 1447, 1455 (1987). Since the neces-
sity and proportionality of Dan's force in the original hypothetical was not an issue, Dan's
and Allan's similar force in the altered hypothetical would presumably also not be prob-
lematic. In any event, each actor's force in the altered hypothetical does not exceed the
degree of force necessary for effective self-protection since each actor's force only partially
impeded the other actor's force. Additionally, since each actor used the same moderately
harmful force against the other, the possible requirement of proportionality would be
satisfied.
Robinson's model self-defense provision is as follows:
Conduct constituting an offense is justified ift
(1) an aggressor unjustifiably threatens harm to the actor, and
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necessary? If Dan had not used force against Allan, Allan would have
unjustifiably attacked Dan, unimpeded by any force from Dan. As a
result, Dan would have sustained an even more forceful blow from
Allan. Therefore, it may reasonably be maintained that Dan's force
was necessary and justified.
A similar argument also demonstrates that Allan's force is neces-
sary and justified. Since Allan's beliefs about Dan and actions against
Dan are identical to Dan's beliefs about Allan and Dan's actions
against Allan, the same reasoning showing Dan's force to be justified
would also reveal Allan's force to be justified. Under the objective
theories, however, force used against justified force cannot be justi-
fied. Fletcher's incompatibility thesis and Robinson's correlate princi-
ple dictate that in any conflict between two opposed parties, only one
of the parties can be justified.34 If both Dan's force and Allan's force
are justified, then each used force against the other's justified force
and thus paradoxically neither actor's use of force would be
justified.35
Yet if neither actor's use of force is justified, then each actor used
force against unjustified force. Force used against unjustified force is
eligible to bejustified. Since Dan's force and Allan's force satisfy all of
the requirements under the objective theories, their use of force is
justified. Therefore, if neither actor's force is justified, then paradoxi-
(2) the actor engages in conduct harmful to the aggressor:
(a) when and to the extent necessary for self-protection,
(b) that is reasonable in relation to the harm threatened.
2 ROBINSON, supra note 6, § 3-3, Model Codifications, app. A, at 565.
An actor "is privileged to use only that degree of force actually necessary for self-protec-
tion .... [T] he force used is not justified if the individual actor could protect himself
effectively with less." Id. § 121 (a), at 5. An actor's force must also be reasonable or
proportional:
The proportionality requirement places a limit on the maximum harm that may be
used in protection or furtherance of an interest. It bars justification when the harm
caused by the actor may be necessary to protect or further the interest at stake, but is
too severe in relation to the value of that interest.
Id. Each actor's force in the hypothetical does not exceed the degree of force necessary
for self-protection since each actor's force only partially impeded the other actor's force.
Additionally, since each actor used similarly harmful force against the other, the propor-
tionality requirement is satisfied.
34 See supra notes 20, 26.
35 The paradox may be set out as follows:
(1) Dan's force and Allan's force are each justified.
(2) Each actor was justifiably attacked.
(3) Each actor used force against justified force.
(4) According to Fletcher's incompatibility thesis and Robinson's correlate principle,
force used against justified force cannot be justified.
(5) Therefore, neither Dan's force nor Allan's force is justified.




cally both actors' use of force is justified.36
If both actors' use of force is justified or neither actor's use of
force is justified, then a paradox ensues. If both actors' use of force is
justified, then neither actor's use of force is justified; if neither actor's
use of force is justified, then both actors' use of force isjustified.3 7 As
a result, if both actors' use of force is justified or neither actor's force
is justified, each actor's force is both justified and not justified under
the objective theories of justification.
Although the contention that both actors' use of force is justified
or neither actor's force is justified leads to the above paradoxes, the
claim that one actor's use of force is justified and the other actor's
force is unjustified is also problematic. Since each actor holds the
same beliefs about the other actor and each uses similar force at the
same time, there is no basis for differentiating between Dan's and Al-
lan's conduct as to which is justified. Furthermore, the "universal"
nature ofjustification-espoused by Robinson and Fletcher-dictates
that if one actor's force is justified, a similarly situated actor would
also be justified in the use of similar force.a8 As a result, if either
36 The paradox may be set out as follows:
(1) Neither Dan's force nor Allan's force is justified.
(2) Each actor was unjustifiably attacked.
(3) Each actor used force against unjustified force.
(4) Force used against unjustified force is eligible to be justified.
(5) Each actor's force satisfies all the other requirements in order to be justified
under the objective theories ofjustification.
(6) Therefore, Dan's force and Allan's force are both justified.
The conclusion in step (6) contradicts the premise in step (1) upon which the conclusion
is based.
37 The paradoxical situation is as follows:
(1) If each actor's force is justified, then neither actor's force is justified.
(2) If neither actor's force is justified, then each actor's force is justified.
(3) Same as (1).
(4) Same as (2).
Consequently, a vicious circle is generated.
38 "Claims ofjustification lend themselves to universalization. That the doing is objec-
tively right (or at least not wrongful) means that anyone is licensed to do it.... Excuses, in
contrast, are always personal to the actor...." FLErCHER, supra note 1, at 761.62. Fletcher
also explains the universal character ofjustification as follows:
When the principles ofjustification are rendered concrete in particular cases, the re-
sult is a precedent that other people may properly rely upon in similar cases.... In
similar cases arising in the future, similarly situated actors may rely on these recog-
nized privileges in planning their conduct. The onlyrequirement for claiming the
precedent is the general legal rule that the new case may not be significantly different
in its relevant facts.
Id. at 810-11.
Robinson also endorses the universal nature ofjustification: "Since justification is de-
pendent not on the actor but only on the act, an act which isjustifiable when performed by
one actor is necessarilyjustifiable when performed by any actor." Robinson, supra note 26,
at 278 n.49. Robinson further states that since the nature ofjustification is universal, "any
other actor engaging in the same conduct under the same oljective circumstances must be
1994]
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Dan's force or Allan's force is justified, the other's force must also be
justified; if either Dan's force or Allan's force is unjustified, the
other's force must also be unjustified.
However, according to Fletcher's incompatibility thesis, and
Robinson's correlate principle, in order for one actor's force to be
justified, the other actor's force must not be justified. Thus,
Fletcher's thesis and Robinson's principle are in contradiction with
the universal nature of justification depicted by both objective theo-
ries. Consequently, it appears that each actor must simultaneously
have both the samejustification status as the other actor and a different
justification status than the other actor. The resulting paradox may
be set forth as follows:
(1) Since there is no relevant basis for differentiating Dan's conduct
from Allan's conduct as to which is justified, and the nature ofjustifica-
tion is universal, then both actors' use of force is justified or neither
actor's use of force is justified.
(2) According to Fletcher's incompatibility thesis and Robinson's corre-
late principle, if one of the actor's force is justified, then the other ac-
tor's force cannot be justified.
(3) Therefore, neither actor's use of force is justified.
(4) Yet if neither actor's use of force is justified, then both actors' use of
force is justified.
(5) Same as (2).
(6) Same as (3).
(7) Same as (4).
Consequently, under the objective theories ofjustification, Dan's use
of force and Allan's use of force are each justified and not justified in
violation of the law of noncontradiction. 39 Therefore, whether Dan's
use of force or Allan's use of force is justified is paradoxically indeter-
minate under the objective theories.
B. SUBJECTIVE THEORY (MODEL PENAL CODE)
Since Dan and Allan each reasonably believed that his own use of
force was justified, Dan's force and Allan's force would both be justi-
similarly justified." 2 ROBINSON, supra note 6, § 121(c), at 8.
39 See generally Stephan Korner, Laws of Thought, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPH'v 414
(Paul Edwards et al. eds., Reprint ed. 1972) (discussing the law of noncontradiction or
principle of contradiction as one of the three fundamental laws of logical reasoning). One
commentator has stated the consequences of violating the law of noncontradiction: "Con-
fusion is the predictable consequence of simultaneous endorsement of irreconcilable posi-
tions. It is the penalty attached to violation of one law that even the Supreme Court
cannot ignore: the law of noncontradiction." Lawrence A. Alexander, Constitutional Torts,
the Supreme Court, and the Law of Noncontradiction: An Essay on Zinermon v. Burch, 87 Nw. U.
L. REv. 576, 596 (1993). For Fletcher's view of contradictions in legal thought see supra text
accompanying note 9, note 10, text accompanying note 27 and infra note 80, text accompa-
nying note 122, note 132.
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fled under § 3.04 of the Model Penal Code (MPC).40 That Dan and
Allan would have conflicting justifications would not be disturbing or
surprising to proponents of the subjective theory since they correctly
acknowledge that conflicting justifications will occasionally arise
under the subjective theory of justification. 41
C. CONCLUSION
Whereas the subjective § 3.04 of the MPC42 incurs no conceptual
anomalies, both objective theories ofjustification succumb to concep-
tual difficulties in handling Hypothetical 1. The contradiction gener-
ated under these theories could be avoided in a number of ways. As
seen in the presentation of the paradox, the culprits would seem to be
Fletcher's incompatibility thesis and Robinson's correlate principle
which state that force used against justified force cannot be justified.
If Fletcher's thesis and Robinson's principle were removed from the
objective theories, both Dan's force and Allan's force would be justi-
fied. The conclusion that each actor's force is justified would no
longer yield the opposite conclusion that neither actor's force is justi-
fied and the self-contradictions would not arise.
Perhaps, however, a less drastic means could be found to avoid
the paradoxes. For instance, both objective theories might require
(instead of justificatory purpose or knowledge of the justificatory cir-
cumstances, as Fletcher's theory requires) 43 that an actor have knowl-
edge of the justificatory circumstances or such knowledge and
justificatory purpose. If neither Dan nor Allan had such knowledge,
neither actor's force would be justified under such an amended objec-
tive theory. As a result, the conceptual difficulties incurred by the ob-
jective theories would be effectively circumvented.
II. LOGICAL CONTRADICTION DERIVED FROM FLETCHER'S AND
ROBINSON'S OBJECTiVE THEORIES CANNOT BE AVOIDED BY REQUIRING
KNOWLEDGE OF THE JUSTIFICATORY CIRCUMSTANCES
Applying the objective theories to the following hypothetical will
result in a logical contradiction that cannot be avoided by an amend-
ment requiring knowledge of the justificatory circumstances. Con-
40 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1):
Subject to the provisions of this Section and of Section 3.09, the use of force upon or
toArd another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immedi-
ately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force
by 9dch other person on the present occasion.
41 See supra note 18.
42 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04.




Cindy andJoanne, two bitter enemies who have had physical altercations
with each other on many occasions, unexpectedly meet each other on a
dark, deserted street. Neither wishes to attack the other, yet neither
wishes to be unjustifiably attacked. Each reasonably believes that the
other will imminently use unjustified force against her. Because of their
history of hostile encounters, Cindy reasonably believes thatJoanne will
unjustifiably use self-defense force because Cindy believes that Joanne
believes that Cindy will reasonably, but mistakenly, use self-defense force
against her (Joanne). Also due to their history of violence, Joanne rea-
sonably believes that Cindy will unjustifiably use self-defense force be-
cause Joanne believes that Cindy believes that Joanne will reasonably,
but mistakenly, use self-defense force against her (Cindy). Acting withjustificatory intent, each uses similar force against the other simultane-
ously. Each actor's use of force interferes with the other actor's use of
force.
A. FLETCHER'S AND ROBINSON'S OBJECTIVE THEORIES
Under an objective theory, are Cindy andJoanne putatively justi-
fied? If Cindy had complete knowledge of the circumstances, she
would have known that Joanne would imminently use force against
her, because Joanne believed that Cindy would mistakenly use self-
defense force against her (Joanne). In fact, that is what Cindy actually
believes. Thus, Cindy correctly comprehended the circumstances.
Furthermore, if Cindy had not used force against Joanne, Joanne
would have unjustifiably used force against Cindy, unimpeded by
Cindy's force. As a result, Cindy would have sustained an even more
forceful blow from Joanne. Therefore, even if Cindy did have com-
plete knowledge of the situation, Cindy would still have reasonably
and correctly believed that her force was necessary andjustified. Con-
sequently, Cindy is not putatively justified. A similar form of argu-
ment would also demonstrate thatJoanne is not putatively justified.
Since each actor reasonably believed that her force was justified,
each one has the requisite justificatory purpose. Therefore, each one
satisfied Fletcher's requirement of havingjustificatory intent or knowl-
edge of the justificatory circumstances. 44 Suppose further that the
force each actor used was proportional and necessary. 45 The only re-
maining issue then is whether the actor in question was unjustifiably
threatened or attacked. Since Fletcher's incompatibility thesis and
Robinson's correlate principle dictate that force cannot justifiably be
used against justified force, if the actor in question was justifiably at-
tacked the actor cannot be justified. Only an unjustified attack or
44 Id.
45 See supra note 33.
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threat against an actor would render the actor's force eligible to be
justified.
The first consideration is whether Cindy was unjustifiably at-
tacked. This depends on whether Joanne's force is justified. But
whether Joanne's force is justified depends on whether Cindy's force
is justified. In turn, whether Cindy's force is justified depends on
whether Joanne's force is justified. A vicious circle ensues.
If both actors' use of force is justified, then Fletcher's thesis and
Robinson's principle would dictate that neither actor's force is justi-
fied. Yet if neither actor's use of force is justified, then each actor was
unjustifiably attacked. Since Cindy's force and Joanne's force satisfy
all of the other requirements for justification under the objective the-
ories, both Cindy's force and Joanne's force would be justified. Yet if
both actors' use of force is justified, then according to Fletcher's thesis
and Robinson's principle neither actor's use of force is justified.
This circularity can be avoided if one actor's force is justified and
the other actor's force is unjustified. There is no relevant basis, how-
ever, to differentiate Cindy's conduct from Joanne's conduct as to
which is justified. Moreover, the universal nature of justification dic-
tates that if either of the actors' force is justified, then the other's
similar force under similar circumstances would necessarily also be
justified.46 Therefore, either both Cindy's force and Joanne's force
are justified, or neither actor's force is justified-a conclusion which
leads to the above logical contradiction.47
Perhaps the issue can be approached from a different direction.
As stated in the hypothetical, each actor believes that the other actor's
use of force is unjustified. If it can be determined which actor's belief
is correct, then it can be decided which actor's force, if any, is justi-
fied. If Cindy's reasonable belief that Joanne would use unjustified
force is correct, thenJoanne's force is unjustified, Cindy's force isjus-
tified, and Joanne's reasonable belief is incorrect. Similarly, if Jo-
anne's reasonable belief that Cindy would use unjustified force is
46 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
47 The paradoxical situation may be set out as follows:
(1) Since there is no relevant basis for differentiating Cindy's conduct fromJoanne's
conduct as to which is justified, and the nature ofjustification is universal, both actors'
use of force is justified or neither actor's use of force is justified.
(2) According to Fletcher's thesis and Robinson's principle, if one of the actor's force
is justified then the other actor's force cannot be justified.
(3) Therefore, neither Cindy's nor Joanne's force is justified.
(4) Yet if neither Cindy's force norJoanne's force is justified, then both Cindy's force
and Joanne's force are justified.
(5) Same as (2).
(6) Same as (3).
(7) Same as (4).
As a result, a vicious circle ensues.
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correct, then Cindy's force is unjustified, Joanne's force is justified,
and Cindy's reasonable belief is incorrect. Thus, it seems that in or-
der for one of the actors to be correct and her force justified, the
other actor must be incorrect and her force unjustified.
However, it is impossible to determine which actor is correct and
which actor's force isjustified. Each actor's relevant thoughts and ac-
tions are similar; each holds the same beliefs regarding the other; and
each uses similar force, at the same time, against the other. Based on
the universal nature of justification, both actors must be correct or
neither actor can be correct. If both actors are correct, then neither
actor's use of force is justified. But if both are correct, then paradoxi-
cally both are incorrect (in order for either to be correct, the other
must be incorrect).48 If both actors are incorrect, then both actors'
use of force is justified. Therefore, if both Cindy andJoanne are cor-
rect, then paradoxically each actor's force is both justified and not
justified at the same time.
If neither is correct, then both actors' use of force isjustified. Yet
if neither is correct, then paradoxically both are correct (in order for
either to be incorrect, the other must be correct).49 If both are cor-
rect, then neither actor's use of force is justified. Therefore, if both
Cindy and Joanne are incorrect, then their use of force is both justi-
fied and not justified at the same time.
As a result, regardless of whether Cindy andJoanne are both cor-
rect or both incorrect, Cindy's force andJoanne's force are each justi-
fied and notjustified at the same time. The objective theories are self-
contradictory in their treatment of this hypothetical situation.
48 The paradox may be set out as follows:
(1) Both Cindy's andJoanne's reasonable belief that the other would use force unjus-
tifiably is correcL
(2) Therefore, Cindy used unjustified force and Joanne used unjustified force.
(3) Force used against unjustified force is eligible to be justified.
(4) Since Cindy's force andJoanne's force satisfy all the other requirements in order
to be justified, Cindy's force and Joanne's force are justified.
(5) Therefore, both Cindy's and Joanne's reasonable belief that the other would use
force unjustifiably is incorrect
The conclusion in step (5) contradicts the premise in step (1) upon which the conclusion
is based.
49 The paradox may be set out as follows:
(1) Both Cindy's and Joanne's reasonable belief that the other would use unjustified
force is incorrecL
(2) Therefore, Cindy used justified force andJoanne used justified force.
(3) Each actor used force against justified force.
(4) Force used against justified force cannot be justified under an objective theory.
(5) Therefore, neither Cindy's force norJoanne's force is justified.
(6) Both Cindy's andJoanne's reasonable belief that the other would use unjustified
force is correct.




B. SUBJECTIVE THEORY (MODEL PENAL CODE)
Since Cindy and Joanne each reasonably believed that her own
use of force was justified, Cindy's force andJoanne's force would both
be justified under § 3.04 of the MPC.50 That both of the actors' use of
force is justified does not present conceptual difficulties since propo-
nents of the subjective theory readily acknowledge that conflicting jus-
tifications may occasionally arise.51
C. CONCLUSION
Hypothetical 2 does not present difficulties for § 3.04 of the
MPC, 52 but is substantially problematic for both Robinson's and
Fletcher's objective theories of justification. Under those theories, if
both actors' use of force is justified or neither actor's use of force is
justified, paradoxically each actor's use of force is both justified and
not justified. Since there is no relevant basis, in principle, for differ-
entiating Cindy's conduct from Joanne's conduct as to which is justi-
fied, and the nature of justification is universal, it cannot be the case
that one actor's force is justified and the other actor's force is unjusti-
fied. Yet, for one of the actor's force to be justified, the other actor's
force must be unjustified; for one of the actor's force to be unjusti-
fied, the other actor's force must be justified. This conclusion is con-
tradicted by the universal character of justification and the fact that
there is no basis for differentiating between the actors' conduct as to
which is justified. The objective theories' treatment of this hypotheti-
cal situation is self-contradictory. As a result; whether Cindy's force or
Joanne's force is justified is paradoxically indeterminate under the ob-
jective theories.
Further, a requirement of knowledge of the justificatory circum-
stances, which perhaps circumvented the contradiction in Hypotheti-
cal 1, would not avoid the contradiction in Hypothetical 2. Since both
Cindy andJoanne correctly apprehended what the other believed and
that the other would imminently use force, each satisfies the knowl-
edge requirement. One might argue, however, that each actor must
know that the other actor will unjustifiably attack to satisfy the pro-
posed knowledge requirement. Yet, such an issue would seem to be a
legal conclusion rather than part of the knowledge of the factual cir-
cumstances giving rise to eligibility for a justification. If so, then
Cindy and Joanne each have knowledge of the justificatory circum-
stances and the tentatively proposed amendment to the objective the-
50 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04.
51 See supra note 18.
52 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04.
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ores fails to remove the paradox.
Suppose that to satisfy the proposed knowledge requirement,
each actor must know that the other actor will unjustifiably attack.
First, consider whether Cindy had knowledge that Joanne would un-
justifiably attack her-i.e., whether Cindy's reasonable belief was cor-
rect. As discussed above, it is indeterminate whether Cindy's
reasonable belief is correct. As a result, it is indeterminate whether
Cindy had such knowledge. A similar form of argument would also
demonstrate that it is indeterminate whetherJoanne's reasonable be-
lief was correct and therefore, it is indeterminate whetherJoanne had
such knowledge.
Some critics might argue that since it is indeterminate whether
each had the requisite knowledge, neither actor satisfies the tenta-
tively proposed amendment requiring knowledge of the justificatory
circumstances. Those critics would consequently conclude that
neither actor's force is justified, and the logical contradiction derived
from the objective theories in their present form would not arise
under their tentatively amended formulation. But that argument is
flawed.
If it is claimed that neither actor had the requisite knowledge of
the justificatory circumstances, then neither actor's force would be
justified under the tentatively amended objective theories. If neither
actor's force is justified, then each actor was unjustifiably attacked. If
each actor was unjustifiably attacked, then each actor was correct
(Cindy andJoanne each reasonably believed that the other would im-
minently and unjustifiably attack). If each actor's reasonable belief
was correct, each had knowledge of the justificatory circumstances.
The claim that neither actor had the requisite knowledge of thejustifi-
catory circumstances leads to the self-contradictory conclusion that
each actor does have the requisite knowledge. As a result, the tenta-
tively proposed amendment requiring knowledge of the justificatory
circumstances would not avoid the logical contradiction. Similarly,
amending the objective theories so as to require both justificatory pur-
pose and knowledge of the justificatory circumstances would also fail
to dislodge the paradox. Section VI will discuss a possible amendment
to the objective theories which perhaps avoids this self-contradiction.
III. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS
A. ATYPICAL HYPOTHETICALS
Although the situations depicted in Hypotheticals I and 2 are un-
likely to transpire with great frequency, they are nonetheless plausible
and possible. Therefore, the fact that they demonstrate that the ob-
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jective theories are contradictory is significant, and should be of sub-
stantial concern to proponents of, and jurisdictions employing, an
objective theory ofjustification. 53 Furthermore, Hypothetical 1 is only
a slight variation on Fletcher's hypothetical. Thus, proponents of the
objective theory cannot criticize it as being too atypical without weak-
ening the strength of their own hypotheticals and the contentions
which they buttress. In fact, the use of hypotheticals to examine the
soundness of a theory or to illuminate an aspect of criminal law is
supported by Fletcher himself: "I have addressed the possible implica-
tions of treating the theoretical solution of hypothetical problems as a
matter of high priority. '54 Today's unlikely hypothetical may well be
tomorrow's paradigmatic example.55
B. SIMULTANEITY
Proponents of an objective theory might also argue that the si-
multaneous use of force by the actors in Hypotheticals 1 and 2 is im-
possible because given sufficient precision, it would always be possible
to ascertain a temporal difference between the force employed by
each actor, however slight. However, while simultaneity may be un-
likely, it is not impossible. Even Fletcher agrees "that two or more
persons can simultaneously make an effort to shoot a wild fox."5 6
Nonetheless, an advocate of the objective approach to justifica-
tion might still argue that there is something untoward about relying
on simultaneity in a hypothetical situation. Yet proponents of an ob-
jective theory have employed the concept of simultaneity apparently
without objection. Professor Sharon Byrd imposed simultaneity on
53 See supra text accompanying note 9, note 10, text accompanying note 27, note 39 and
infra note 80, text accompanying note 122, note 132.
54 George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23
U.C.LA. L. REv. 293, 294 n.6 (citing Fletcher, supra note 11). See also JoHN C. SMITH,
JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE IN THE CaMINAL LAW 28-29 (1989) ("Let me take a ratherfar-
fetched example-such examples are often the most vivid way of illustrating some legal prin-
ciple or problem.").
55 Fletcher, supra note 20; at 228 (citing Fletcher, supra note 11) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted):
Some twenty years ago my imaginary character the "psychotic aggressor" made his
debut in the pages of the Israel Law Review. Of all the hypothetical cases I have de-
vised over the years, the story of the psychotic aggressor in the elevator, attacking
someone who must defend herself, has become one of the most vigorous and long-
lasting. This unlikely case....
Another example of an influential hypothetical that transcended its own implausibility is
Francis Bacon's "famous hypothetical case of two shipwrecked [drowning] sailors strug-
gling to gain control of a plank [that will only keep one of the sailors afloat]." FLETCHER,
supra note 1, at 819 (citing FRANcis BACON, ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON LAWES OF ENGLAND
(1630), in 13 COLLECTED Woaxs 131 (Montague ed., 1831)).
56 Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1358 (emphasis added).
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another commentator's hypothetical since " [o]therwise, the example
loses its force."57 Byrd also utilizes simultaneity in a hypothetical of
her own: "If we both arrive at exactly the same time .... ,,58 One of
the "cornerstones" of Fletcher's incompatibility thesis is his notion of
incompatible acts, which he defines negatively: "Acts are incompati-
ble if they cannot be performed simultaneously."5 9 If simultaneous
acts of force are impossible or dismissed as untoward, then Fletcher's
definition loses all content.
If the use of simultaneity is somehow impermissible, the onus
would seem to be placed on advocates of an objective theory to ex-
plain why. The subjective theory incurs no conceptual difficulties
when applied to hypothetical situations involving simultaneous force.
Why is only the objective theory rendered self-contradictory? More-
over, if there is nothing troubling about two persons reaching a plank
simultaneously, arriving at a destination at exactly the same time, and
shooting at a fox simultaneously, there is certainly nothing impermis-
sible about two persons using force against each other simultaneously.
In any event, the following hypothetical does not depend on si-
multaneous force, but still creates conceptual difficulties for the objec-
tive theories. Suppose the situation is the same as Hypothetical 2,
except that Cindy hits Joanne slightly before Joanne hits Cindy. Ulti-
mately, the non-simultaneity of the force employed does not affect the
objective theories' treatment of Cindy's and Joanne's conduct.
If both actors' use of force is justified or neither actor's use of
force is justified, then paradoxically each actor's use of force is both
justified and not justified at the same time. Perhaps, however, the
non-simultaneity of the force employed provides a relevant basis for
determining which actor's force is justified and which actor's force is
unjustified. An outcome of one actor's force being justified and the
other's force being unjustified might not be problematic for the ob-
jective theories.
First, consider whether Joanne's force is justified. If Joanne had
not used force, Joanne would have sustained an even more forceful
blow since Cindy's force would have been unimpeded. Therefore, it
was necessary that Joanne used protective force. Since Joanne acted
with justificatory intent and her force was proportional, as well as nec-
essary,60 Joanne's force would be justified if Cindy's force was unjusti-
fied. Whether Joanne's force is justified would then depend on
57 Byrd, supra note 2, at 1333 n.132. In the text accompanying the footnote, Byrd states,
"[a]ssuming that both of these persons reach the plank at the same time." Id. at 1333.
58 Id.
59 Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1358.
60 See supra notes 33 and 45 and accompanying text.
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whether Cindy's force was justified. A similar form of argument would
also demonstrate that Cindy's force is justified if Joanne's force was
unjustified. Whether Cindy's force is justified would then depend on
whether Joanne's force was unjustified. A vicious circle ensues.
Next, consider whether or not Cindy's force is justified. Since
Cindy hitJoanne first, arguably initiating the aggression, it is tempting
to argue that Cindy's force is unjustified. Nonetheless, Cindy's force
is eligible for justification since at the time she used force againstJo-
anne, Cindy was subject to an imminent attack from Joanne.
Another argument is that since Cindy hitJ6anne first, any justifi-
cation for Cindy's force would "vest" prior to any justification for Jo-
anne's slightly subsequent force. Under the objective theories, force
used againstjustified force cannot bejustified. IfCindy's force isjusti-
fled, Joanne's force would be employed against Cindy's already justi-
fied force. Therefore, one might conclude that Cindy's force is
justified, Joanne's force is unjustified, and the contradiction does not
arise under conditions of non-simultaneous force.
However, the above analysis is problematic. First, Joanne's force
being unjustified rests on the premise that Cindy's force is justified.
Yet the same argument supporting Cindy's force being justified also
supports Joanne's force beingjustified. Thus the underlying premise
of the above argument (that Cindy's force is justified) is untenable.
Second, even if it were possible to justify only Cindy's force, a troub-
ling anomaly arises. Justifying Cindy's force and not justifying Jo-
anne's force, solely on the basis of Cindy's quickness and superior
hand speed, would constitute a reductio ad absurdum. Had it been the
case thatJoanne was quicker and hit Cindy first, Joanne's force would
be justified and Cindy's force unjustified. Thus, a slight difference in
hand speed renders Cindy's act "right and proper"6 1 and the "supe-
rior social interest,"62 but transforms Joanne's identical, but slightly
slower, conduct into legal and moral wrongdoing. It is absurd to
think that a theory of criminal responsibility would attach such weight
to as trivial a factor as hand speed. But if the anomaly ofjustifying the
actions of the person who acts more quickly is to be avoided, objectiv-
ists would have to accept the logical contradiction of each actor being
both justified and not justified at the same time. In turn, in attempt-
ing to avoid the logical contradiction resulting from both actors' use
of force being justified or neither actor's use of force being justified,
the reductio ad absurdum ofjustifying the quicker actor ensues.
61 Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1357.
62 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 761.
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In contrast, § 3.04 of the MPC 63 would justify both actors' use of
force without incurring any conceptual problems. Since each actor
reasonably believed that her force was justified, the non-simultaneity
of the force employed would not affect the subjective theory's analysis.
C. FACTUAL UNCERTAINTY
Supporters of the objective theories of justification might argue
that the indeterminacy as to whether the actors' use of force in the
hypotheticals is justified is factual and not theoretical or conceptual.
As a result, they would assert that the hypotheticals do not demon-
strate the contradictory nature of the objective theories. For instance,
Fletcher states that in cases of factual uncertainty, it may be difficult to
determine which actor's force is justified, but maintains that in a situa-
tion of conflict there is only one party that has the superior right to
exercise force:
[I] n cases of incompatible conduct, one and only one party must have a
right to prevail. It is undoubtedly difficult in many cases to determine
who has this superior right. If our principle is that self-defense applies
only against wrongful or unjust aggressors, then we might well encoun-
ter factual problems in determining who the aggressor is. The simple
factual issue of who started the fight might not lend itself to factual re-
construction. There might be difficulties in principle in deciding
whether someone who has provoked the fight is the aggressor or victim
of the other's aggression. But to concede these difficulties is not to
abandon the quest for the superior right in situations of conflict.
In modem legal thought, we are likely to confuse two distinct issues:
(1) Can we reliably determine who has the superior right in a situation
of forcible conflict? and (2) Is there a superior right that permits one
and only one party to exercise force? I concede that we cannot always
resolve the issues of fact and value in determining who has the right to
resist aggression. But this difficulty provides little warrant for cynicism
or nihilism about whether one party is acting rightfully and the other
wrongfully.64
However, the indeterminacy of the status of the actors' force in
the hypotheticals, and the resulting logical contradictions from which
the objective theories suffer, are not the result of factual uncertainty.
The hypotheticals provide all the relevant facts necessary to ascertain
whether each actor's force is justified. For example, it is not the case
that one party used unjustified aggression first and the hypotheticals
failed to provide the necessary information to determine which actor
unjustifiably initiated the aggression. Hypotheticals 1 and 2 clearly
state that the actors used force simultaneously. It is also not the case
63 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04.
64 Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1360-61.
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that provocation occurred, but there is insufficient information in the
hypotheticals to ascertain which actor was the provoker.
The claim that insufficient factual information caused the logical
contradictions raises two questions: First, precisely what information
is not provided that would be necessary to dissolve the indeterminacy?
Second, Hypothetical 1 furnishes no less factual information than
Fletcher's original hypothetical regarding Dan and Allan 65 (and per-
haps furnishes more factual information) and since the information
provided in the original hypothetical was presumably sufficient, how
would the factual information in the altered hypothetical be insuffi-
cient? Advocates of the objective theories have no satisfactory reply to
these questions.
Contrary to what Fletcher claims, these hypotheticals demon-
strate instances in which, as a matter of principle, each actor in a con-
flict does and does not have a superior right to exercise force.
Hypotheticals 1 and 2 provide substantial "warrant for cynicism or ni-
hilism about whether one party is acting rightfully and the other
wrongfully."66
IV. PROCEDURAL RAMIFICATINS
Due to the logical contradiction of each actor in Hypotheticals 1
and 2 being simultaneously justified and notjustified under the objec-
tive theories, the theoretical solution as to whether each actor is justi-
fied is paradoxically indeterminate. Suppose, however, that each
actor in any one of the hypotheticals was charged with assault and
battery, and brought to trial in a jurisdiction incorporating an objec-
tive theory ofjustification. Because of the allocations of the burdens
of production and persuasion, the prosecution would be unable to
show that either actor is unjustified, and the trier of fact would have to
conclude that each actor's force is justified-a violation of both
Fletcher's incompatibility thesis and Robinson's correlate principle.
Justification defenses are considered to be affirmative defenses.6 7
As an affirmative defense, the defendant actors would have the bur-
den of production. 68 To satisfy the burden of production, each actor
must supply "sufficient evidence, considered in the light most
favorable to the defendant and all reasonable inferences therefrom,
to allow a rational factfinder to find the issue for -the defendant by a
65 Fletcher, supra note 3, at 972-73.
66 Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1361.
67 2 ROBINSON, supra note 6, § 3-1 (7), Model Codifications, app. A, at 565 ("Alljustifica-
tion defenses defined in this Chapter are affirmative defenses.").
68 Id. § 1-5 (2) (a), at 552 ("Unless otherwise provided, the defendant shall have the bur-
den of production as to: (i) justification defenses described in Chapter 3 of this title.").
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preponderance of the evidence."69 For example, in Hypothetical 2,
Cindy andJoanne would each be able to furnish evidence that she was
attacked, that her force was necessary and proportional, and that she
acted with justificatory purpose. Since the evidence would be consid-
ered in the most favorable light,70 it would appear that Cindy and
Joanne would each be able to furnish the evidence necessary to satisfy
the justification defense criteria.
The issue would then be submitted to the trier of fact and the
prosecution would bear the burden of persuasion.71 "[T] he prosecu-
tion must prove (or negate, as the case may be) the existence of that
issue beyond a reasonable doubt or the trier of fact must decide the
issue against the prosecution."72 Since whether each actor's force is
justified is paradoxically indeterminate, the prosecution would not be
able to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that either actor's force is
unjustified.73 As a result, the trier of fact would be forced to conclude
that both Cindy's force and Joanne's force were justified.74
Although the theoretical solution is indeterminate, the proce-
dural rules advanced by an objective theorist appear to dictate that the
trier of fact would determine that each actor was justified in her use of
force. Therefore, the substantive principles of the objective theories,
which state that conflicting or incompatible justifications are "logically
impossible,"75 are in contradiction with the procedural rules gov-
erning justification defenses advocated by a proponent of the objec-
tive approach. Furthermore, the contradiction is not the result of
inadequate or incomplete evidence regarding the justificatory
circumstances. 76
V. THEORETICAL RAMIFICATIONS
Applying the objective theories to Hypotheticals 1 and 2 demon-
strates that the objective theories are self-contradictory. If the subjec-
69 Id. § 1-5(2) (b), at 552.
70 If the evidence suggests that each actor's force is simultaneously justified and not
justified, one might infer that each actor's force is justified or that neither actor's force is
justified. A reasonable inference, made in the light most favorable to the defendants, is that
each actor's force is justified.
71 2 ROBINSON, supra note 6, § 1-6(2), Model Codifications, app. A, at 552 ("Except as
provided in Subsection (3) of this Section, the prosecution shall have the burden of per-
suasion on all issues."). Subsection (3) of § 1-6 does not provide an exception to § 1-6(2)
regarding justification defenses. Id. § 1-6(3), at 552.
72 Id. § 1-6(1) (a), at 552.
73 Id.
74 If the prosecution does not meet the burden of persuasion, "the trier of fact must
decide the issue against the prosecution." Id.
75 Fletcher, supra note 3, at 978.
76 See supra notes 64 to 66 and accompanying text.
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tive theory was also subject to the effect of the paradoxes, the
occurrence of the paradoxes under the objective theories would be
comparatively less disturbing. Thus, the fact that the contradictions
introduced in this Article arise only under objective theories should
concern proponents of, and jurisdictions employing, an objective
approach. 77
As noted, Fletcher states that "we can use the concepts ofjustifica-
tion and excuse only when we are willing to accept the logical conse-
quences of applying them to particular cases of conflict."78 Even if
advocates of an objective approach accept the logical contradictions
derived from their theory, they still might argue that those contradic-
tions are no more problematic than the conflicting justifications gen-
erated by the subjective theory's "assimilating a putative justification
to an actual justification."79 However, the conflicting or incompatible
justifications derived from the subjective theory are not nearly as
problematic as the logical contradictions (introduced in this Article)
faced by the objective theories. The subjective theory's problem of
conflicting justifications is a criticism only from the perspective of an
objective theory; but the self-contradictions in the objective theories
provide a criticism of the objective theories on their own terms.
Although the subjective theory is flawed from a view external to itself,
it is not self-contradictory. The objective theories, however, are inter-
nally inconsistent and illogical.80
The logical contradictions inherent in the objective theories have
significant implications for the objective theories' view of the nature
of justification. Fletcher states that justified conduct is "right and
proper"8' and represents the "superior social interest."8 2 Yet, if an ac-
tor's force can be simultaneously justified and not justified, as the ob-
jective theories' analysis of Hypotheticals 1 and 2 would suggest, then
77 See supra text accompanying note 9, note 10, text accompanying note 27, note 39 and
infra note 80, text accompanying note 122, note 132.
78 Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1358.
79 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 763.
80 A comment by Fletcher indicates that logical inconsistency in a theory is
unacceptable:
This Article commits itself to logical consistency as the indispensable foundation for
effective dialogue and coherent criticism. Only if we accept consistency as the overrid-
ing legal value will we be troubled by the paradoxes and antinomies that lie latent in
our undeveloped systems of legal thought. Grappling with uncovered paradoxes and
antinomies will impel us toward consistent theoretical structures.
Fletcher, supra note 10, at 1264-65.
For Fletcher's further thoughts on the unacceptability of logical inconsistency in legal
thought see supra text accompanying note 9, note 10, text accompanying note 27 and infra
text accompanying note 122 and note 132.
81 Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1357-58.
82 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 761.
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the actor's conduct is both "fight and proper,"83 and wrong and im-
proper at the same time. The actor's conduct represents the "supe-
rior social interest"8 4 and the inferior social interest at the same time.
Robinson contends that "[tihe nature of the justification principle is
such that a given course of conduct either does or does not cause a
net harm."8 5 Justified conduct does not cause a net harm, but unjusti-
fiable criminal conduct does cause a net harm. Yet, by applying the
objective theories to Hypotheticals 1 and 2, each actor's force does
cause a net harm and does not cause a net harm.
That an actor's force can be right and wrong can constitute the
superior and inferior societal interest, and can yield a net benefit and
a net harm, may provide support for ProfessorJoshua Dressler's con-
tention that justified conduct may, in some situations, be that which is
merely "tolerable" or "permissible."86 Dressler suggests that there are
strong justifications (conduct that is right and beneficial) and weak
justifications (conduct that is merely permissible or tolerable). 7 Kill-
ing a child aggressor, for example, would be conduct that is not desir-
able or beneficial but only tolerable and thus would be a weak
justification.88 Fletcher counters that "[a] justified act would then ap-
pear to be something more than an excused act, but something less
than one that the actor has a right to do. The concept of 'permissibil-
ity' captures this middle position.... This is a powerful suggestion,
but one that ultimately fails."89 Yet, if an actor's force may be right
and wrong at the same time, Dressler's middle position of permissibil-
ity more readily accommodates the situations depicted in Hypotheti-
83 Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1357-58.
84 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 761.
85 2 ROBINSON, supra note 6, § 121(d), at 10 (footnote omitted).
86 Dressier, supra note 8, at 63-64, 69-77; Dressier, supra note 2, at 1161 n.22. For other
arguments against Fletcher's view thatjustification necessarily entails right and proper con-
duct see Lawrence Alexander, Justifications and Innocent Aggressors, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 1177
(1987); Eric Colvin, Exculpatory Defences in Criminal Law, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 381,
395-401 (1990); Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 1904-07; Husak, supra note 2, at 500;
Morawetz, supra note 23, at 289 n.42.
87 Dressier, supra note 2, at 1161 n.22.
88 Id.
89 Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1359. For Fletcher's additional views on permissibility see
Fletcher, supra note 3, at 977 ("The concept of the permissible enters to fill the apparent
gap between the rightful and the wrongful.... The 'permissible' flows from a skepticism
about the possibility of a single solution."). Fletcher contends that the concept of permissi-
bility fails because incompatible justifications would then be possible, violence would be
encouraged instead of suppressed, and intervenors could render aid to either party in a
dispute. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1359-60. Yet if the incompatibility thesis must be excised
to avoid self-contradiction (as this Article will suggest), the above consequences will none-
theless arise. See infra text accompanying notes 91-96, 114-18. To avoid self-contradiction,




cals 1 and 2.90
Fletcher states that an "important" consequence of the justifica-
tion-excuse distinction regards the rights of third parties.91 A third-
party intervenor may justifiably come to the aid of an actor whose
force is justified but may not justifiably interfere with such an actor.92
If the actor is excused (or the actor's conduct satisfies the definition
of a criminal offense, but is not justified), a third-party intervenor may
notjustifiably use force in aid of the actor and may justifiably interfere
with the actor's force.93 However, under the objective theories, if an
actor's force is both justified and not justified at the same time, as is
each actor's force in Hypotheticals 1 and 2, the intervenor canjustifia-
bly use force in aid of the actor and cannotjustifiably use force in aid
of the actor. Furthermore, since the intervenor would be using force
against another actor whose force is simultaneously justified and not
justified, the intervenor would be both justifiably interfering and unjus-
tifiably interfering with the other actor's unjustified and justified force.
Considering the chaos described above, no one could claim that
the objective theories are properly ordering "the matrix of legal rela-
tionships affected by a claim of justification."94 Moreover, Fletcher
states that "if our legal ideal is the suppression of violence, then we
must employ a set of ideas that enables us to determine upon whose
side we should intervene."95 As seen above, the objective theories fail
to determine which actor is eligible to receive aid from an intervenor,
allowing an intervenor to pick either side. In the event of multiple
intervenors, the objective theories would increase the violence rather
than suppress it. By Fletcher's own stated criteria, the objective theo-
ries incorporate a set of ideas that must not be employed.
In light of Hypotheticals 1 and 2, are Fletcher's incompatibility
thesis and Robinson's correlate principle valid? In order for
Fletcher's thesis and Robinson's principle to be clearly wrong, both
actors' use of force in one of the hypotheticals would have to be justi-
fied and only justified. However, each actor's force in the hypotheti-
cals is not quite justified-it is justified and not justified at the same
time. But, even though Fletcher's thesis and Robinson's principle ap-
pear to be technically correct, they may be meaningless and invalid. If
90 Under Dressler's framework, the actors in Hypotheticals 1 and 2 might be construed
as having weak justifications under an objective approach.
91 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 760-61, 830.
92 Id. at 760-61, 830, 859; 2 ROBINSON, supra note 6, § 3-1(3), Model Codifications, app.
A, at 565.
93 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 760-61, 869-70; 1 ROBINSON, supra note 6, § 36(a) (3), at
165.
94 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 763.
95 Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1360.
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the source of the logical contradictions derived from the objective the-
ories is Fletcher's thesis and Robinson's principle, as the analysis of
Hypotheticals 1 and 2 suggests and the next Section will argue, then
they are logically meaningless. If a proposition (1) results in X and
not X at the same time, thereby violating the law of noncontradic-
tion,96 the proposition is logically meaningless or invalid.
If Fletcher's incompatibility thesis is meaningless or invalid,
Fletcher's theory loses the primary support for its tenet that putative
justification should not be assimilated to actual justification. Fletcher
contends that either of two propositions, "if accepted would lead to
the distinction between actual and putative [justification]. The first
proposition is that subjective belief cannot by itself render conduct
justified .... 97 The second proposition is the incompatibility the-
sis.98 The first proposition begs the question since the subjective the-
ory maintains that reasonable subjective belief renders conduct
eligible for justification. If the second proposition is logically mean-
ingless or invalid, there is no reason to maintain a clear distinction
between putative justification and so-called actual justification.
The fact that the objective theory is self-contradictory also has im-
plications for the fields of comparative criminal law and comparative
modes of legal analysis. The prevailing common law or Anglo-Ameri-
can approach to justification embodies the subjective theory ofjustifi-
cation. 99 The civil law or Continental approach incorporates an
objective theory ofjustification which is said to be followed in Western
Europe, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Latin America, and
Japan. 100 Fletcher states that the Continental approach utilizes "struc-
tured"10 1 legal thinking and emphasizes "the Right." 0 2 "The Right
stands for a monistic legal order, for the existence of one right answer
in every legal dispute. The Right requires us to believe that only one
party can be justified in any situation of conflict."10 3 In contrast, the
Anglo-American approach employs "flat"104 legal discourse, empha-
96 See supra note 39.
97 Fletcher, supra note 3, at 973.
98 Id. at 975.
99 Id. at 971-80.
100 Id. at 972.
101 Id. at 951 ("Structured legal discourse proceeds in two stages: first, an absolute norm
is asserted; and second, qualifications enter to restrict the scope of the supposedly disposi-
tive norm.").
102 Id. at 950-54.
103 Id. at 980.
104 Id. at 951 ("Flat legal discourse proceeds in a single stage, marked by the application
of a legal norm that invokes all of the criteria relevant to the resolution of a dispute.").
One commentator has stated that "[t]he distinction between flat and structured thinking
may be a chimera." Morawetz, supra note 23, at 306 (footnote omitted).
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sizes "reasonableness,"1 0 5 and reflects a pluralistic legal order in which
there may be "several reasonable solutions to a particular dispute
... "106 Fletcher contends that structured legal analysis and the Con-
tinental approach are superior because they do not yield incompatible
justifications.1 0 7 As a result, a sharp distinction between putative justi-
fication and so-called actual justification can be maintained. 0 8
Yet, the logical contradictions generated by the objective theories
ofjustification cast doubt upon the claimed superiority of the civil law
or Continental approach and structured legal discourse. Applying the
objective theories to Hypotheticals I and 2 demonstrates that the Con-
tinental approach and structured legal thought produce not "one
right answer,"10 9 but two contradictory answers. It would appear that
the Continental approach and structured legal discourse reflect not a
monistic legal order but a self-contradictory, pluralistic legal order.
Fletcher finds support for his conception of justification in Pro-
fessor Ronald Dworkin's thesis that there is only one right answer in
every dispute"1 0 and "that one of the parties in every hard case has a
right to a decision in his favor. .. ."1" However, Dworkin's thesis is
reflected neither in the subjective theory, which generates conflicting
justifications, nor in the objective theories, which both justify and do
not justify each party's conduct in Hypotheticals 1 and 2. This para-
dox makes it impossible to determine which party has a right to a
favorable decision. Thus, at least regarding conduct eligible for ajus-
tification, Dworkin's thesis appears to be invalid.112
VI. AMENDING THE OBJECrIVE THEORIES TO AVOID
SELF-CONTRADICTION
Various amendments to the objective theories have been pro-
posed which, if adopted, would successfully avoid the logical contra-
diction illustrated in Hypothetical 1. For instance, eliminating
Fletcher's incompatibility thesis and Robinson's correlate principle
105 Fletcher, supra note 3, at 950-54.
106 Id- at 981.
107 Id- at 973.
108 I&
109 Id. at 980.
110 Id. at 981 (citing Ronald M. Dworkin, No Right Answer, in LAW, MoAirry AND Socr-
my 58, 84 (Peter M.S. Hacker &Joseph Raz eds., 1977)).
111 Id. at 981 n.139.
112 Dworkin's thesis emerges as a reply to H.LA Hart's claim that judicial discretion is
inevitable since in some cases there is no single right answer but a plurality of reasonable
solutions. See H.LA. HART, THE CONCE r oF LAw 128-30 (1961). Dworkin argues that
judicial discretion is unwarranted since there is always a single right answer in every legal
dispute. See RoNALD M. DWORKIN, TAmNG RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 36 (1977).
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would successfully circumvent the paradox. However, the self-contra-
diction can be dislodged by less drastic means. Instead of Fletcher's
theory requiringjustificatory purpose or knowledge of the justificatory
circumstances, 1 3 a requirement of justificatory purpose and knowl-
edge of thejustificatory situation, or simply knowledge of thejustifica-
tory circumstances might dissolve the paradox for both objective
theories ofjustification. Nonetheless, that amendment would not dis-
lodge the objective theories' self-contradiction in Hypothetical 2.
The self-contradiction facing the objective theories in their treat-
ment of Hypothetical 2 may require an amendment excising
Fletcher's incompatibility thesis and Robinson's principle (Amend-
ment 1). Under this amended theory, force used against justified
force could be justified, and the logical contradiction would dissolve.
Both Cindy's and Joanne's force would then be justified (as would
both actors' use of force in Hypothetical 1). The excisement of
Fletcher's thesis and Robinson's principle avoids the conclusion that
if both actors' use of force is justified then neither actor's force is
justified. As a result, the paradox of Cindy's force and Joanne's force
each being simultaneously justified and not justified would not arise.
Although Fletcher's incompatibility thesis and Robinson's corre-
late principle are at the core of the objective theories ofjustification,
the proposed amended objective theories would still differ substan-
tially from the subjective theory. Actors' reasonable, but incorrect, be-
liefs that they are being threatened with harm or that they are being
attacked would still not suffice to render them eligible for a justifica-
tion under the tentatively amended objective theories. An actual
threat or actual force (from an objective view of the circumstances)
would still be a necessary condition for an actor's force to be justified.
Thus, the objective theories would continue, in their tentatively
amended forms, to exclude putative justification from so-called actual
justification.
The proposed amended objective theories would nonetheless in-
cur substantial difficulties. Robinson, in commenting on one state's
self-defense provision, provides an apt criticism of the proposed
amended objective conceptions of the self-defense justification:
Some [statutes] fail to restrict properly the authorized use of defensive
force, providing instead ajustification whenever it is necessary to defend
against "the use.., of physical force." Such a formulation is clearly too
broad, for it contravenes the logic ofjustifications by apparently permit-
ting defensive force in response to ajustified attack. Suppose Xunjusti-
fiably attacks Y, and Ylawfully defends through the use of physical force.
Such a provision would apparently allow X to then use additional force
113 FLETcHER, supra note 1, at 559-60, 565.
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in response to Y"s justified defensive force.' 14
The amended objective theories would fall prey to the same criticism
since they would also justify Xs additional force. Thus, in avoiding
the logical contradictions derived from the unamended objective the-
ories, each amended objective theory "contravenes the logic of
justifications."15
Fletcher's original hypothetical involving Dan's reasonable, but
mistaken, attack against Allan more fully illuminates this problem. 116
Under the present and amended objective theories, Dan's attack
would not be justified since Dan was not actually threatened or sub-
jected to force, and Allan's use of force against Dan would be justified.
Yet any force Dan used subsequent to Allan's force would be eligible
forjustification (clearly an unfortunate result under the amended for-
mulation of the objective theory), since Dan was subjected to actual
force. At this point, Dan and Allan would have conflicting justifica-
tions. Furthermore, an intervenor could justifiably come to the de-
fense of either Dan or Allan or even switch back and forth. In the
event of multiple intervenors, one or some intervenors could justifia-
bly aid Dan, and other intervenors could justifiably aid Allan. The
amended objective theories, though free of self-contradiction, would
fail to properly order "the matrix of legal relationships" 1 7 and would
create situations of legal anarchy for which the subjective theory has
been criticized. 118
The adoption of an additional rule might remedy this problem.
The rule might take the following form: an actor whose force is ini-
tially unjustified is barred from justifiably using force against an actor
whose force is justified (Amendment 2). Amendment 2 would pre-
vent Dan's second use of force, in Fletcher's hypothetical, from being
justified; prevent Dan and Allan from having conflicting justifications;
and permit intervenors to justifiably aid only Allan. The rule would
avoid legal anarchy and restore the proper "matrix of legal relation-
ships."1 9 Furthermore, Amendment 2 would still allow aggressors
whose force is initially unjustified to use force justifiably against their
victims, if the victims used excessive (and thus unjustified) force
against them. Amendment 2, however, would have no effect on Hy-
potheticals 1 and 2 and, thus, would not completely bar conflicting
114 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLuM. L. REv. 199,
276 (1982) (footnote omitted) (quoting CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-19(a) (West 1972)).
115 Id.
116 Fletcher, supra note 3, at 972-73.
117 FLETcHER, supra note 1, at 763.
118 Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1359.




Amendment 1, excising Fletcher's thesis and Robinson's princi-
ple, resolves the logical contradictions in the objective theories as ap-
plied to Hypotheticals 1 and 2, but creates new difficulties not
encountered by the unamended objective theories. The adoption of
Amendment 2 corrects some of those difficulties, but also causes new
problems not faced by the unamended objective theories.
Consider the following two examples: First, suppose a police of-
ficer usesjustifiable force in the arrest of a criminal suspect. The sus-
pect then uses only that force necessary to resist the police officer's
force. Under the unamended objective theories, the suspect's force
would be unjustified (presumably the correct result) since it was used
against the police officer's justified force. The suspect's force would
be justified, however, under Amendment 1 of the amended objective
theories since the suspect used force against actual force. Also,
Amendment 2 would not bar a justification for the force because the
suspect did not previously or initially use unjustified force.
Second, suppose A justifiably uses force against B under a choice
of evils justification. 12 1 B then uses only that force necessary to resist
A's force. B's force, employed against A'sjustified force, would not be
justified (presumably the correct result) under the unamended objec-
tive theories. But since B used force against actual force and did not
previously or initially use unjustified force, B's force (as well as A's
force) would be justified under the amended objective theories.
Since justifying the suspect's force and B's force is undesirable,
the tentatively amended objective theories are untenable. Could the
tentatively proposed amended objective theories be further revised so
as tojustify neither the suspect's force nor B's force? Excising Amend-
ment 1 (i.e., reinstating Fletcher's thesis and Robinson's principle)
would bar an actor's force from being justified when used against jus-
tified force. Thus, the suspect's force and B's force would be unjusti-
fied. But eliminating Amendment 1 would reintroduce the logical
contradictions arising in Hypotheticals 1 and 2.
120 In Hypothetical 1, neither Dan nor Allan initially used unjustified force. Similarly,
neither Cindy norJoanne initially used unjustified force in Hypothetical 2. In the variation
of Hypothetical 2, in which Cindy hitJoanne slightly beforeJoanne hit Cindy, Cindy could
not be construed to have initially used unjustified force. Since Cindy's use of force was
necessary, Cindy did not initially use unjustified force despite being the initial party to use
force.
121 A choice of evils or lesser evils justification applies when an actor's conduct consti-
tutes a criminal offense, but, in light of the circumstances, does not constitute a net harm
or evil. 2 ROBINSON, supra note 6, § 124(a), at 46. For an objective theory's formulation of
the justification, see, for example, id. Model Codifications, app. A, § 3-2, at 565. For a
subjective theory's formulation, see, for example, MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02.
328 [Vol. 85
MISTAKENJUSTIFCATION
Another amendment, providing that self-defense force cannot
justifiably be employed againstjustified police force orjustified choice
of evils force (Amendment 3), would prevent both the suspect's force
and B's force from being justified. Yet this approach may not be alto-
gether satisfactory. It has a blatantly ad hoc quality. The objective the-
ories would no longer provide a unified, comprehensive conception
of justification. It might offend the logic of justifications to say that
self-defense force could be justifiably employed against justified self-
defense force (Hypotheticals 1 and 2) but not against justified police
force orjustified choice of evils force. Such a makeshift framework
would inevitably succumb to as yet unanticipated situations requiring
still further revisions to avoid anomalies.
A few tentatively proposed amendments to the objective theories
have been briefly sketched. Amendment 1 avoids the logical contra-
dictions, but allows conflicting or incompatible justifications. It also
creates additional conceptual difficulties. Amendments 2 and 3 re-
solve those difficulties-with marginal success-but create additional
ones. Each revision provides a solution to one anomaly while giving
rise to yet another anomaly. Of course, if these problems cannot be
overcome, the objective theory could be abandoned in favor of the
subjective theory, or perhaps there are other viable ways to circumvent
the logical contradictions derived from the objective theories.
Fletcher suggests a methodology for resolving paradoxes in legal
thought:
When a paradox is uncovered, we can restore consistency in our legal
structures in one of two ways: (1) by finding or constructing a distinc-
tion ... that dissolves the paradox or (2) by abstaining from the legal
practice that leads us into the contradiction. We can think of these as
the theoretical and legislative alternatives. Consistency requires either
that we change theory to conform to practice, or change practice to con-
form to theory. Neither of these polar alternatives seems satisfactory. If
we manipulate theory in order to conform to practices that seem sound
to us, theory becomes nothing more than a pliable tool of rationaliza-
tion. Yet it seems difficult to abandon a practice like [requiring that an
actor face unjustified force, or a threat of unjustfied force, in order for
the actor's force to be eligible for justification] . . . simply because we
have not yet found the proper distinction for resolving the paradox at
the level of theory.122
In exploring possible amendments to the objective formulation ofjus-
tification, this Article has pursued what Fletcher terms the legislative
alternative. Perhaps a distinction could be constructed that would dis-
solve the logical contradictions without generating additional anoma-
lies. Articulating such a distinction, however, seems, at present,





The archetypal self-defense scenario consists of a culpable aggres-
sor wrongfully attacking an innocent victim who rightfully, for self-
protection, uses what otherwise would be wrongful force against the
aggressor.' 23 It might be said that in such self-defense situations two
wrongs make a right. Yet in applying the objective theories ofjustifica-
tion to Hypotheticals 1 and 2, two rights make two wrongs, 24 which
generate two rights ad infinitum. Each actor's rightful and justified
conduct transforms the other actor's rightful and justified conduct
into wrongful and unjustified conduct. In turn, each actor's wrongful
and unjustified conduct causes the other actor's wrongful and unjusti-
fied conduct to be rightful and justified conduct. A determination
that each actor's use of force is justified (or unjustified) "cannibalizes
itself"' 25 and generates the opposite conclusion. A vicious circle or
"infinite alternation of opposite conclusions"126 ensues. Conse-
quently, each actor's force is simultaneously justified and unjustified
in violation of the law of noncontradiction. 127
The contradiction incurred by both objective theories, in regard
to Hypothetical 1 may be circumvented by an amendment requiring
knowledge of the justificatory circumstances. It appears, however,
that only an amendment to the objective theories, which eliminates
Fletcher's incompatibility thesis and Robinson's correlate principle,
provides a resolution to the contradictions in both Hypotheticals 1
and 2. Yet, amending the objective theories in this manner creates an
amended objective theory which "contravenes the logic of justifica-
tions.... ",128 The tenet that force cannot justifiably be used against
justified force is at the center of the objective theories ofjustification.
Its removal not only eviscerates the objective theories, but also creates
a host of new problems not encountered by the unamended objective
theories. The adoption of a second amendment may avoid some of
123 See Gerald Epps, Any Which Way but Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes Toward
Violence in the Evolution of the Anglo-American "Retreat Rule, "55 LAw & COm'EMP. PROBS. 303,
303-04 (1992).
124 One commentator has described the paradox of blackmail by asking "[w]hy do two
rights make a wrong?" James Lindgren, Blackmaik An Afterword, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1975,
1975 (1993).
125 Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction, 40
STAN. L. REV. 929, 958 (1988) (discussing modes of legal discourse which paradoxically
circle back and consume themselves).
126 Id. at 947.
127 See supra note 39.
128 Robinson, supra note 114, at 276.
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the resulting difficulties. However, that amendment gives rise to addi-
tional anomalies which require yet another amendment. It is not
clear whether this third amendment provides an entirely satisfactory
solution. If the difficulties are considered insuperable, adopting the
subjective theory of justification may be the only alternative.
Although the adoption of Amendment 1 would expunge the logi-
cal contradictions, and further amendments arguably resolve the re-
sulting anomalies, neither the unamended nor the amended
formulations can support the objective theories' depiction of the na-
ture of justification. Applying the unamended objective theories to
Hypotheticals 1 and 2 results in each actor's use of force being both
justified and notjustified at the same time. Even under the tentatively
proposed amended objective theories, the actors' use of force gener-
ates conflicting and incompatible justifications. Under either the
amended or unamended objective theories, it is no longer the case
that only one party has the superior right to prevail. Furthermore,
how can each opposed actor's conduct be right and proper and repre-
sent the superior social interest? Justified conduct cannot be consid-
ered necessarily right, good, and proper; it must be conduct that is
permissible, tolerable, and reasonable. The objective theories ofjusti-
fication, unamended or amended as proposed, fail to embody the
Right and "a monistic legal order, for the existence of one right an-
swer in every legal dispute.' 29
To avoid self-contradiction, the objective theories may be forced
to reflect a pluralistic legal order with reasonableness as the para-
mount value. Thus, both parties to a dispute may be justified in that
their conduct is permissible, reasonable, or tolerable. Yet if reasona-
bleness is to be the underlying value of an amended objective theory
of'justification free of self-contradiction, there is no reason to require
that an actor's force be actually necessary. Actors' reasonable beliefs suf-
fice to render their conduct eligible for a justification. There is no
reason not to assimilate putative justification to an "actual" justifica-
tion. If reliance on the Right leads to a self-contradiction I30 and an
emphasis on reasonableness, while conceptually consistent, is none-
theless deemed "philosophically dubious,"' 31 perhaps proponents of,
129 Fletcher, supra note 3, at 980.
130 See Kant, supra note 20.
131 Fletcher, supra note 7, at 662. Fletcher's comment addresses the subjective theory of
justification employed by the MPC: "[T]he infelicitous implication that someone who be-
lieves, mistakenly, that he is acting in self-defense actually is justified in what he is doing. I
have done battle elsewhere with this philosophically dubious conception of justification
.... " Id. (footnote omitted).
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and jurisdictions employing, an objective approach will be challenged
to establish a new theoretical framework' 3 2 to support an objective
conception of justification.
132 See Fletcher, supra note 10, at 1294 ("If we wish to avoid disabling contradictions, we
must reach a deeper understanding of the legal premises that guide our thinking.").
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